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Discover our latest articles about cloud-native technologies, Kubernetes, DevOps, and modern software development. From practical tutorials to in-depth analyses.
Latest Blog Posts
Stay up to date with our latest articles about cloud-native technologies, Kubernetes, and DevOps.
1219 posts
A field report on federating two Authentik instances via OIDC: undocumented behavior in group sync, source enrollment, expression policies and login flows – with concrete patterns that work instead.
The beginning of a platform – why every architecture eventually reaches the point where it must rethink the network.
Good platforms are not built by adding more infrastructure – they are built through clearly defined responsibilities.
A connection is not yet an HTTP request – why modern edge platforms begin much earlier than many architecture diagrams suggest.
Compute is not the platform – why modern applications today consist of two platforms.
Why high availability starts in the network today – failures are not an exceptional state, but an architectural principle.
One IP address can exist in three places at once – why Anycast is not a feature, but a property of the internet.
The internet does not know applications – why BGP does not try to find the fastest path.
Kubernetes 1.38 is targeted for December 2026. Here is what is emerging for the release and which milestones matter.
An application can be fully operated in Germany and still rely on US infrastructure for every single access.
We recently introduced the ayedo Edge Cloud, a European edge infrastructure for DNS, Anycast, load balancing, web application firewall, DDoS protection, and controlled access to applications.
The underestimated architecture of modern applications – why modern applications no longer begin in the data center.
TLS for Kubernetes does not necessarily end at the Ingress. Central TLS termination at the ayedo Edge Cloud simplifies certificate management, WAF integration, and traffic control. However, additional encryption up to the cluster protects further network segments. The right decision depends on trust boundaries, operating model, compliance, and desired fault isolation.
Kubernetes DNS and public name resolution address different challenges. Cluster resources are aware of services, ingresses, and workloads; the Edge Cloud manages public endpoints, DNS zones, and backend forwarding. A resilient operational model separates these responsibilities but automates their handovers through clearly defined interfaces.
A Kubernetes Service of type `LoadBalancer` often ties public access to the respective cloud or infrastructure provider. An independent edge layer separates this responsibility from the cluster: routing, protection, TLS, and accessibility are centrally organized, while Kubernetes can be operated at ayedo or another provider. This reduces provider dependencies and simplifies multi-cloud architectures.
A publicly accessible Kubernetes API server doesn't need to allow direct internet access to its backend address. A preceding edge layer can handle routing, TLS, DDoS protection, and backend cloaking. The key remains the separation between public accessibility, cryptographic authentication, and actual authorization within the cluster.
Kubernetes Ingress and Edge Cloud serve different purposes. The Edge Cloud controls the public entry point, protects applications, and terminates TLS. In contrast, Kubernetes Ingress describes the routing within the cluster. A clear separation prevents duplicate rules, contradictory security configurations, and complex operational states.
Edge Security Monitoring reveals how protective measures impact public traffic. Traffic and usage statistics help operationally assess WAF rules, DDoS protection, and exposed endpoints. However, they do not fully explain individual attacks nor replace logs, traces, and application-centric security telemetry.
Multi-Cloud Security often fails not due to a lack of protective features, but because of its distributed implementation. A centralized edge architecture consolidates public access, WAF, DDoS protection, TLS termination, and routing in front of heterogeneous backends. Provider independence, an autonomous system, and active-active operation reduce control and dependency points.
DDoS protection and application security address different levels of attacks. The edge can assess volume, protocols, connection rates, and request patterns to discard malicious traffic early. However, whether a valid request is being misused can often only be determined in the application context. Effective protection combines both levels with clear responsibilities.
A robust **security layered architecture** distributes protection tasks across different levels: TLS secures the transport connection, the WAF evaluates HTTP requests, and the backend remains responsible for authorization, validation, and data protection. The critical points are the handover points between these layers. Each decryption, forwarding, and protocol conversion creates its own trust and operational requirements.
Security functions should not be confined to a single location. The edge is suitable for protective measures with high visibility, significant scaling needs, and standardizable rules. The application remains responsible for identity, authorization, and business access controls. Key factors include context requirements, misconfiguration risks, and how early an attack can be detected and mitigated.
A public attack surface is not just created by individual vulnerabilities, but by the entire internet-exposed architecture. Anycast Loadbalancing, WAF, DDoS Protection, TLS Termination, and Backend Cloaking must therefore be considered as an interconnected security zone in front of the backends. The key is which traffic actually reaches the backends and under what conditions.
TLS termination at the edge shortens the path from client to protected entry point but shifts responsibilities. Certificates, trust boundaries, and backend connections must therefore be planned separately. The central question is not whether TLS ends at the public entrance, but which connections remain encrypted afterwards and how their identities are verified.
