Trump Cards Against Trump:

Europe’s Economic Power

The trade conflict with the USA is reflexively narrated in Europe as a power asymmetry. Washington imposes tariffs, threatens sanctions, or uses its technological dominance as leverage – and Brussels reacts. The image: a dependent continent, caught between security policy ties and economic vulnerability.

A recent research paper by the think tank “Dezernat Zukunft” questions this narrative. The analysis comes to a clear conclusion: The European Union has significantly more economic leverage over the USA than is commonly assumed. The problem is not a lack of power. It is a lack of strategic use.

Industrial Key Positions: Europe’s Underestimated Strength

The USA is massively advancing the expansion of nuclear energy and AI infrastructure. Both require physical resources and industrial components that are not entirely in American hands.

For the expansion of nuclear energy, the United States requires substantial amounts of uranium. A relevant part of the supply chains runs through European players. At the same time, the demand for data centers is growing exponentially – and with it the need for energy and cooling infrastructure. In key segments, such as specialized gas turbines, European companies control essential parts of the global value chain.

This means: America’s digital growth is materially embedded in transatlantic dependencies. Those who possess critical industrial precursors have structural influence.

Financial Interconnection: Europe’s Capital as Leverage

The mutual dependency is even more evident in the financial system. European investors hold US government bonds and stocks worth trillions. These capital flows stabilize the refinancing of the United States and support the valuation of American corporations.

The debate about “Sell America” earlier this year – triggered by an analysis questioning Europe’s role as a financier of the USA – led to short-term unrest in the US markets. Even the theoretical option of a strategic reallocation of European capital investments had an impact.

A coordinated, politically motivated capital withdrawal would not be a trivial scenario. It would also affect Europe. But it is a lever. And levers have an effect simply by existing.

Digital Dependency Is Not a One-Way Street

The mutual vulnerability is most evident in the digital sector. Europe is operationally deeply embedded in US platforms, cloud infrastructures, and semiconductor ecosystems. This dependency is real and problematic.

Yet, the one-dimensional victim narrative falls short here as well. A politically motivated withdrawal of digital services from Europe – for example, through export restrictions or regulatory escalation – would have massive economic consequences for US tech companies. The European market is a double-digit percentage revenue driver for many of them.

Such a downturn would not only affect corporate balance sheets but also American domestic politics. Millions of US citizens invest directly in stock markets through 401(k) retirement plans. A massive drop in major tech stocks would have immediate effects on private retirement savings. Economic policy escalation would thus become a domestic political risk.

This interconnection limits the escalation capability of both sides. Dependency is mutual.

Why Europe Does Not Use Its Power

If the structural levers exist – why does the EU still act defensively?

First: Cost distribution. Countermeasures in trade or technology conflicts affect member states differently. Export-oriented economies bear different risks than domestic markets. Without mechanisms for fair burden-sharing, national interests block collective strategies.

Second: Strategic culture. The EU primarily sees itself as a regulatory space, not as a geopolitical actor. Market size is used as normative power, not as an economic pressure instrument. This creates moral coherence but strategic restraint.

Third: Technological asymmetry. Despite industrial strengths, Europe lacks its own scaling power in key digital infrastructures. Cloud, hyperscalers, AI models, and semiconductor design are predominantly US-dominated. This gap relativizes existing levers, even if it does not negate them.

Sovereignty Means Coordination

The debate about tariffs and trade deals falls short. It’s not about symbolic toughness but about structural resilience. Those who want to use economic power need internal stability.

Europe needs binding political agreements to compensate for asymmetric burdens. A true internal market for capital, energy, and digital infrastructure would increase strategic capability. Equally central is the consistent expansion of its own technological capacities – from semiconductor manufacturing to cloud infrastructure to open AI ecosystems.

Digital sovereignty is not a rhetorical question. It is a question of investment and coordination.

Conclusion: Strength Without Strategy Remains Ineffective

The notion of a structurally blackmailable Europe is analytically shortened. The EU has industrial key positions, financial levers, and market power. It is economically more relevant to the USA than public debate suggests.

But power does not unfold automatically. It must be politically desired, institutionally secured, and strategically deployed. As long as Europe does not resolve its internal distribution conflicts and systematically reduces technological dependencies, its strength remains latent.

The trade conflict with the USA is therefore less a proof of European weakness than a test of European capability to act. The economic trump cards are on the table. The decisive factor is whether Europe is willing to understand them as strategic instruments – and to bear the consequences collectively.