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Europe’s Structural Dependence on Big Tech
The debate on digital sovereignty is no longer a technological detail. It is a question of political agency. Since the visible rapprochement of leading US tech entrepreneurs with the Trump administration, it has become clear how closely economic platform power and political influence are intertwined.
Dutch digital expert Marietje Schaake clearly categorizes this development: Technology is not just an economic factor but a tool of power. Europe has long underestimated this dimension.
In the past twenty years, an economic policy paradigm has dominated that primarily understood innovation as a market-driven process. Particularly in Silicon Valley, an ecosystem of platform companies, venture capital, and political deregulation emerged. This model became globally influential – including in Europe.
Regulatory interventions like the GDPR, the Digital Markets Act, or the Digital Services Act came late. They set frameworks but do not change the structural starting point: The central digital infrastructures – cloud services, social networks, operating systems, advertising platforms, AI models – are predominantly controlled by US corporations.
In many areas, Europe is a user, not a provider.
The dependency is not only technological but also financial. European investors hold massive stakes in US tech companies. According to Schaake, Dutch pension funds alone invest around 200 billion euros in American tech stocks.
Thus, European capital stabilizes those structures increasingly perceived as a political risk. The contradiction is obvious: Strategically, digital autonomy is discussed, economically, the existing dominance is further strengthened.
Since Elon Musk’s acquisition of Twitter, it has become clear that platforms are not just communication spaces but political levers. Ownership decisions directly affect moderation rules, content visibility, and algorithmic prioritization.
When leading tech entrepreneurs openly form political alliances or support election campaigns, the lines between private platform management and political agenda blur. Digital infrastructures thus become geopolitical factors.
For Europe, this means: Central communication channels and cloud infrastructures are subject to legal frameworks and political dynamics outside the EU. Even if data centers are physically located in Europe, parent companies remain subject to American law.
Cloud services, AI models, operating systems, and payment infrastructures are now cornerstones of state functionality. Administration, energy supply, healthcare, defense, and financial systems are digitized.
Digital sovereignty, therefore, does not mean autarky but the ability to design, regulate, and independently operate central infrastructures in times of crisis. In the USA and China, this strategic perspective has been part of state policy for years. In Europe, it was long fragmented.
Initiatives like Gaia-X or recently discussed concepts like “EuroStack” indicate a change in direction. The goal is to build own cloud and AI capacities as well as interoperable European infrastructures. However, implementation at the national level will be crucial: investments, public procurement, standardization, and political prioritization.
A central instrument is the public sector itself. States and municipalities are major customers for software, cloud services, and IT infrastructure. Procurement decisions shape the market.
The debate on open-source solutions in administration and education points to this lever. If public institutions systematically rely on open standards and European providers, economies of scale and market planning security are created.
At the same time, practice shows how strong existing dependencies are: operating systems, office environments, cloud backends, or collaboration platforms are deeply integrated into administrative processes. A strategic shift requires long-term planning, technical migration, and political determination.
European regulation is perceived internationally as ambitious. At the same time, there is criticism that complex requirements hinder innovation and additionally burden European providers.
The challenge is to ensure competition without creating new market entry barriers. Regulation alone does not replace industrial policy. It must be accompanied by investments, research policy, and capital mobilization.
Digital sovereignty does not only concern governments and corporations. Schools, companies, media houses, and individuals decide daily on platform usage, cloud services, and software solutions. Habit, user-friendliness, and pricing structures play a central role.
European alternatives exist in certain areas – such as search engines, collaboration tools, or cloud providers. However, their spread remains limited as long as network effects and market power of established platforms dominate.
Europe is not faced with the choice between complete decoupling and total dependency. The central question is in which key areas own capacities must be built to ensure political agency.
Digital sovereignty is not an end in itself. It is a prerequisite for democratic shaping power in an increasingly technologically structured world.
The past years have shown how quickly geopolitical constellations can change. Those who outsource critical infrastructure also shift decision-making power.
The political conclusion is factually formulated but far-reaching: Tech policy is not a niche. It is a core component of modern economic, security, and democracy policy.
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